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1. Introduction.
ffindezvous aearch concerns problems in which two or more people are attempting to
meet. Although Schelling had discussed this type of problem in his book [11] in 1960, it
was not until 1995 that rendezvous aearch was put in a rigorous mathematical ffamework by
Alpern [1]. In this ffamework it is natural to ask not only if the players can meet but also
the least time that they can do so; this time is called the rendezvous value of the problem.
Alpern’s paper has created considerable interest and papers relating to it have now been
published. Many of theae papers involve two players and, when this happens, the problems
can be divided into two cases, the aeymmetric in which the players are distinguishable and so
can adopt different strategies, and the $\mathfrak{D}^{r}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}$ in which the players are indistinguishable
and forced to use the same strategy.
$\mathrm{V}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{y}$ recently Baston and Gal [7] have considered a form of rendezvous search in which a
player can recoenize another player’s starting point when he reaches it. They called this new
form markstart rendezvous aearch to distinguish it fiiom the previous form which they termed
claaeical rendezvous aearch. Although both form have connections with linear search, the
results in [7] suggest that the forms have different characteristics. Generally speaking, in
claaeical rendezvous search, symmetric problems have so far been considerably more difficult
to solve than asymmetric ones. For instance, Alpern and Gal [4] have proved that, when
two players are placed at a known distance $D$ apart on the line, the asymmetric rendezvous
value is $13\mathrm{D}/8$ whereas only bounds have been obtained for the corresponding symmetric
value (see [4]). In contrast, the results in [7] suggest that, in markstart rendezvous search,
symmetric problems appear to be more amenable to analysis than asymmetric ones.
The primary purpoee of this paper is to prove two results in markstart rendezvous aearch.
Firstly we show thffi, if the initial distance of the players on the line is given by the uniform
distribution on $[0,1]$ , then the (pure) symmetric markstart rendezvous search value is 9/8.
Not only does this solve a problem left open in [7] but it also gives a better upper bound
than Theorem 41 in [7] for the corresponding asymmetric markstart problem. Secondly we
demonstrate that there are markstart optimal strategies which oecillate infinitely but not
around the player’s starting point. This is a new type of optimal behaviour for rendezvous
search problems and it occurs in ones in which the initial distance is $\dot{\mathrm{g}}$ven by a distribution
function $F$ which has ffiite support and for which the probability of being near to $m[] n\{x$ :
$F(x)=1\}$ is $\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}$.
2. Model.
We investigate the symmetric markstart rendezvous aearch problem on the line in which
the initial distance between the players is chosen by the uniform distribution on $[0,1]$ and
the players do not have a comrnon notion of poeitive direction. We discretize the problem by
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considering $[0,1]$ to be compriaed of discrete points $0,1/4n,$ $2/4n,$ $\ldots,4r\iota/4n$ and $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\iota \mathrm{k}\backslash \mathrm{i}(\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ tllar
player 1 starts at $0$ facing in the poeitive direction and that player 2 is placed $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{q}\iota\dot{\mathrm{u}}$probably at
the $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{s}\pm 2/4n,$ $\pm 4/4n,$ $\ldots,$ $\pm 4n/4n$ facing equiprobably in the poeitive and negat ive $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{f}_{!}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\iota \mathrm{h}’$ .
Time is assumed to be discrete and, at each instant of time, the players must move to $(‘ \mathrm{n}1$
adjacent point. This means that, at any time, player 1 and player 2 are either both at even
points ($\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}$ . of the form $2r/4n$) or both at odd points so that the players $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}$ pass each
other without meeting. It is convenient to think of player 2 comprising of four agents which
are placed at $2r/4n$ facing in the poeitive direction, at $2r/4n$ facing in the negative direction,
$-2r/4n$ facing in the poeitive direction $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}-2r/4n$ facing in the negative direction when $2r/4n$
has been chosen via the probability. Such agents will be denoted by $a_{+P},$ $a_{+N},$ $a_{-P}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{d}a_{-N}$
respectively. Note that player 1 will meet $a_{+N}(r)$ and $a_{-N}(r)$ before he or the agent fin& the
starting point of the other whereas player 1 will meet $a_{+P}$ and $a_{-P}$ only after player 1 ffi&
the agent’s starting point or the agent finds player l’s starting point. Namely, if player 1
and player 2 are facing in oppoeite directions then, under a symmetric strategy, they reach
each other’s starting points at the same time and so they must meet before either player
ffi&the other’s starting point. On the other hand, if player 1 and player 2 are facing in the
same direction then, $\iota \mathrm{m}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ a symmetric strategy, they will remain $\mathrm{a}1$ their initial distance
apart at least until one of them locates the other’s starting point.
Since the problem is symmetric, the players use the same strategy which we can consider
to be of the form $k_{1}Fk_{2}Bk_{3}Fk_{4}B,$ $\ldots$ which is interpreted as move $k_{1}$ points forward, then
$k_{2}$ points backward, then $k_{3}$ points forward and so on provided the other player’s starting
point has not been located; once a player locates the other player’s starting point he always
continues in the direction he was taking when he found the starting point. In calculating
when player 1 and an agent meet, it is $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{I}\dot{\mathrm{u}}$ent to have an expression for the poeition of a
player at a particular time under a $\dot{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}$ strategy $s$. To obtain this expression we introduce
the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ notation. Let $s$ be a $\dot{\mathrm{g}}$ven strategy, then, for non-negative integers $m$, put
$\sigma_{s}(m)=\sum_{i=1}^{m}k_{i}$ and $4n \delta_{s}(m)=\sum_{i=1}^{m}(-1)^{i+1}k_{i}$
with the convention thal $\sigma_{s}(0)--0=\delta_{s}(0)$ ; note that $\sigma_{s}(m)$ is the time and $\delta_{s}(m)$ is the (signed)
distance ffom his starting point when the player makes his m-th change of direction under
$s$. Now define $g_{s}(t)$ by
$4ng_{s}(t)=4n\delta_{s}(i)+(-1)^{i}(t-\sigma_{s}(i))$ for $\sigma_{s}(i)\leq t\leq\sigma_{s}(i+1)$ .
It is easy to check that, if the playeIB have not met and player 1 has not located player
$2’ \mathrm{s}$ starting point, then, under $s$, player 1 is $\mathrm{a}lg_{s}(t)$ at time $t$ . Similarly, if the players have
not met and the agent has not located player l’s starting point, then, lmder $s$, the agents
$a_{+P}(r),$ $a_{+N}(r),$ $a_{-P}(r)$ and $a_{-N}(r)$ will be in the poeitions
$g_{s}(t)+2r/4n$ , $-g_{s}(t)+2r/4n$ , $g_{s}(t)-2r/4n$ , and $-g_{s}(t)-2r/4n$
respectively at time $t$.
Thus, under $s$, the meeting times $\tau_{+N}(r;s)$ and $\tau_{-N}(r;s)$ of player 1 with $a_{+N}(r)$ and $a_{-N}(r)$
are the least times $t$ such that $g_{s}(t)=-g_{s}(t)+2r/4n$ and $g_{s}(t)=-g_{s}(t)-2r/4n$ respectively.
Thus
$\tau_{+N}(r;s)=m\dot{I}n\{t:g_{s}(t)=r/4n\}$ and $\tau_{-N}(r;s)=mln\{t:g_{s}(t)=-r/4n\}$ .
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Let
$A_{+}(s)=\{r:g_{s}(\overline{t}(r;s))=2r/4n\}$ and $A_{-}(s)=\{r:g_{s}(\overline{t}(r;s))=-\underline’ r/4n\}$
where
$\overline{t}(r;s)=mIn\{t:|g_{9}(t)|=2r/4n\}$ .
If $r\in A_{+}(s)$ , then, under $s$, player 1 locates the starting point of $a_{+P}(r)$ and $a_{-P}(r)$ locates
the starting point of player 1; in this case the player or agent locating the starting point
continues moving forward. If $r\in A_{-}(s)$ , then, under $s$, player 1 locates the starting point
of $a_{-P}(r)$ and $a_{+P}(r)$ locates the starting point of player 1; in this caae the player or agent
locating the starting point continues moving backwar&.
It is easy to check that, under $s$, the meeting times $\tau_{+P}(r;s)$ and $\tau_{-P}(r;s)$ of player 1 with
$a_{+P}(r)$ and $a_{-P}(r)$ respectively satisfy $\tau_{+P}(r;s)=\tau_{-P}(r;s)=\tau_{P}(r;s)$ say and that
$\tau_{P}(r;s)=\min\{t>\overline{t}(r;s):t-\overline{t}(r;s)=4ng_{s}(t)\}$ if $r\in A_{+}(s)$
and
$\tau_{P}(r;s)=7\dot{m}n\{t>\overline{t}(r;s):t-\overline{t}(r;s)=-4ng_{s}(t)\}$ if $r\in A_{-}(s)$ .
The expected meeting time $E(s)$ of the players rmder $s$ is then given by
$E(s)= \sum_{r=1}^{2n}(\tau_{+N}(r)+\tau_{-N}(r)+2\tau_{P}(r))/8n$ .
Remark 2.1 Let $s$ be a strategy and $0<r\leq 2n$ .
(i) If $r\in A_{+}(s)$ , then $g_{s}(\tau_{P}(r;s))>0$ and $\tau_{P}(r;s)\in[\sigma_{s}(2z-1)+1,\sigma_{s}(2z)]$ for $\infty \mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}z$ .
(\"u) If $r\in A_{-}(s)$ , then $g_{s}(\tau_{P}(r;s))<0$ and $\tau_{P}(r;s)\in[\sigma_{s}(2z)+1,\sigma_{s}(2z+1)]$ for some $z$ .
Proof. Immediate ffom the definitions on noting that $g_{s}$ is decreasing in $[\sigma_{s}(2z-1),\sigma_{s}(2z)]$ and
$g_{s}$ is increasing in $[\sigma_{s}(2z),\sigma_{s}(2z+1)]$ .
Remark 2.2 Let $s$ be a strategy and $0<r\leq 2n$ .
(i) If $r\in A_{+}(s)$ and $r\leq 2n\delta_{s}(2z-1)\leq k_{2z}$ , then $\tau_{P}(r;s)\leq\sigma_{s}(2z-1)+2n\delta_{s}(2z-1)$ .
(ii) If $r\in A_{-}(s)$ and $r\leq-2n\delta_{s}(2z)\leq k_{2z+1}$ , then $\tau_{P}(r;s)\leq\sigma_{s}(2z)-2n\delta_{s}(2z)$ .
Proof. We will prove only (i) because (ii) follows similarly. Suppoee $r\in A_{+}(s)$ and $r\leq 2n\delta_{s}(2z-$
$1)\leq k_{2z}$ , then $g_{s}(0)=0<2r\leq 4ng_{s}(\sigma_{s}(2z-1))$ gives $\overline{t}(r;s)\leq\sigma_{s}(2z-1)$ because $g_{s}(t+1)-g_{s}(t)\in$
$\{1, -1\}$ . Put $f_{s}(t)=t-\overline{t}(r;s)-4ng_{s}(t)$ then $f_{s}(\overline{t}(r;s))=-2r<0$ and $f_{s}(\sigma_{s}(2z-1)+2n\delta_{s}(2z-1))\geq$
$2n\delta_{s}(2z-1)-g_{s}(\sigma_{s}(2z-1)+2n\delta_{s}(2z-1))\geq 0$ because $k_{2z}\geq 2n\delta_{s}(2z-1)$ . Now $f_{s}(t+1)-f_{s}(t)\in\{0,2, -\underline{9}\}$
so $f_{s}(t)$ is even for $t\geq\overline{t}(r;s)$ . Hence there is a $t^{*}$ satisfying $\overline{t}(r;s)<t^{*}\leq\sigma_{s}(2z-1)+2n\delta_{s}(2z-1)$
such that $f_{s}(t^{*})=0$ . Thus $\tau_{P}(r;s)\leq t^{*}$ and the result $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ .
3. Analysis and Results.
In this aection we $\dot{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$ the main theorem which gives a solution for the pure symmetIic
markstart rendezvous aearch model. The proofs of the lemmas use a contradiction argu-
ment and most $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}$ the same pattern. They assume that there is an optimal strategy
$s^{*}$ satisfying certain conditions and then show that there is another strategy $s$ which is an
improvement on $s^{*}$ . In theae proofs we will always aesume $\mathrm{w}’ \mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}$ stating it that $s^{*}$ is given
243
by $h_{1}Fh_{2}Bh_{3}Fh_{4}$B... and $s$ by $k_{1}Fk_{2}Bk_{3}Fk_{4}$B.... In addition we assume that the fore
$h_{1}Fh_{2}B\ldots$ is ffiite with $h_{i}>0$ and that $M$ is the least $M$ for which all agents are $\mathrm{n}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\uparrow$ by
player 1 on or before time $\sigma_{S}\cdot(M)$ . To avoid awkward special conditions in the statements of
some lemmas, we adopt the convention that $h_{M}=10n$ .
Sf the players have not met and a player has not located the other player’s starting
point by the time he reaches a point at distance one ffom $\mathrm{f}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ own starting point, $\mathit{0}$ say, he
knows that the other’s starting point lies on the other side of $O$ and so will start to move
back towards $O$ . Thus a player moves a distance at most one ffom his starting point except
poesibly when he has changed direction the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{U}$ number $(i\vee I)$ of times. This is the import of
our ffist result.
Lemma 1. Let $s^{*}$ be an optimal strategy, then $|\delta_{s}\cdot(w)|\leq 1$ if $w<M$ .
Proof. Suppoee $s^{*}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{S}\Psi}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}1$ with $w<M$ and $|4n\delta_{s^{*}}(w)|=4n+\alpha$ where $\alpha\geq 1$ . We prove only
the caae $4n\delta_{s}\cdot(w)=4n+\alpha$ because the other caae $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ similarly. Let $4n\delta_{s}\cdot(w)=4n+\alpha$ , then
we can take $w$ to be odd. Consider the strategy $s$ with $k_{i}=h_{i}$ for $i\leq w-1,$ $k_{w}=h_{w}-1$ and
$k_{w+1}=10n+\alpha$ . Note that, for all $r,\overline{t}(r;s^{*})\neq\sigma_{s^{\mathrm{r}}}(w)$ and $\tau_{\beta}(r;s^{*})\neq\sigma_{s}\cdot(w)$ for $\beta\in\{P, +N, -N\}$ .
Clearly $g_{s}(t)=g_{s}\cdot(t)$ for $t<\sigma_{s}\cdot(w)-1$ so $\tau_{\beta}(r;s)=\tau_{\beta}(r;s^{*})$ if $\tau_{\beta}(r;s^{*})\leq\sigma_{s}\cdot(w)-1$ . Further, since
$g_{s}(t)<g_{s}\cdot(t)$ for $t\geq\sigma_{s}(w),$ $\tau_{\beta}(r;s)<\tau_{\beta}(r;s^{*})$ for $\beta\in\{P, -N\}$ when $\tau_{\beta}(r;s^{*})>\sigma_{s}\cdot(w)$ ; there are
such $r$ because $\tau_{+N}(r;s^{*})<\sigma_{s}\cdot(w)$ for all $r$ and $w<M$ so $E(s)<E(s^{*})$ which contradicts the
optimality of $s^{*}$ and the lemma $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ . $1$
Lemma 2. Let $s^{*}$ be an optimal strategy.
(a) (i) If $\delta_{s}\cdot(2z+1)>0,$ then $\delta_{s}\cdot(2i+1)<\delta_{s}\cdot(2z+1)$ for $i<z$ .
(ii) If $\delta_{s}\cdot(2z)<0$ , then $\delta_{s}\cdot(2i)>\delta_{s}\cdot(2z)$ for $i<z$ .
(b) If $|\delta_{s}\cdot(i)|\geq 1/2$ , then $4n\delta_{s}\cdot(i)$ is even.
Proof. The proofs of (a) and (b) use the same modified strategy to obtain a contradiction
and $\infty$ we will start the proofs of (a) and (b) in (A) and (B) below and complete them in
(C) below.
(A) The proof of (\"u) is similar to that of (i) so we will only prove (i). Suppoee the result
is false then there is an optimal strategy $s^{*}$ with $\delta_{s}\cdot(2z+1)>0$ and a $j<z$ satisfying
$\delta_{s}\cdot(2j+1)\geq\delta_{s}\cdot(2z+1)$ .
(B) Suppoee $s^{*}$ is an optimal strategy for which there is a $w$ such that $|\delta_{s}\cdot(w)|\geq 1/2$ and
$4n\delta_{s}\cdot(w)$ is odd. We prove only the caae when $w$ is odd, say $2z+1$ , because the other case
$\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ similarly.
(C) Clearly, in both caaes (A) and (B), there is no $r$ such that any of $\tau_{+N}(r;s^{*}),$ $\tau_{-N}(r;s^{*})$ and
$\overline{t}(r;s^{*})$ are in $[\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z+1),\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z+1)+1]$ . Furthennore, using ffimark 2.1, $\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})\neq\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z+1)$
for any $r$ .
Let $w’$ denote the least value of $w>z$ for which there is an $r \leq\max\delta_{s}\cdot(2i+1)$ such that
$i<z$
$\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})=\sigma_{s}\cdot(2w)$ ; if no such $w$ exists we take $w=\infty$ . Now consider $\mathrm{t}\overline{\mathrm{h}}\mathrm{e}$ strategy $s$ given by
$k_{i}=h_{i}$ for $i\leq 2z$ and $i>2w’+1,$ $k_{2z+1}=h_{2z+1}-1,$ $k_{2w’+1}=h_{2w’+1}+1$ , if $w’=z+1,$ $k_{2w^{J=}}h_{2w’}$
whereae, if $w’>z+1,$ $k_{2z+2}=h_{2z+2}-1,$ $h_{i}=k_{i}$ for $2z+3\leq i<2w’$ and $k_{2w’}=h_{2w’}+1$ .
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Note that, if $w’\neq\infty$ , it $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ ffom ffimarks 2.1 and 2.2 that, for any $r\in A_{-}(s^{*})$ with
$\overline{t}(r;s^{*})<\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z+1)$ , we have $\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})<\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z+1)$ and also that $g_{s}\cdot(t)>0$ for $\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z+1)<t\leq$
$\sigma_{s}\cdot(2w’)$ so that, in particular, $\overline{t}(r;s^{*})\neq\sigma_{s}\cdot(2w’)$ . We have
$\sigma_{s}(i)=\sigma_{s}\cdot(i)$ and $\delta_{s}(i)=\delta_{s}\cdot(i)$ for $i\leq 2z$ ,
$\sigma_{s}(2z+1)=\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z+1)-1$ and $\delta_{s}(2z+1)=\delta_{s}.(2z+1)-1/4n$
$\sigma_{s}(2w’)=\sigma_{s}\cdot(2w’)-1$ and $\delta_{s}(2w’)=\delta_{s}\cdot(2w’)-1/4n$
$\sigma_{s}(i)=\sigma_{s}\cdot(i)$ and $\delta_{s}(i)=\delta_{s}\cdot(i)$ for $i\geq 2w’+1$
and, if $w’>z+1$ ,
$\sigma_{s}(i)=\sigma_{s}\cdot(i)-2$ and $\delta_{s}(i)=\delta_{s}.(i)$ for $2z+2\leq i<2w’$ .
It is routine to check that
$g_{s}(t)=\{$
$g_{s}\cdot(t)$ if $t\leq\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z+1)-1$ or $t\geq\sigma_{s}\cdot(2w’)$
$g_{s}\cdot(t+2)$ if $\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z+1)\leq t\leq\sigma_{s}\cdot(2w’)-2$
$g_{s}\cdot(\sigma_{s}\cdot(2w’))-1/(4n)$ if $t=\sigma_{s}\cdot(2w’)-1$




Clearly $\tau_{P}(r;s)=\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})$ if $\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})\leq\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z+1)-1$ or $\overline{t}(r;s^{*})>\sigma_{s}\cdot(2w’)$ . Further, if $\overline{t}(r;s^{*})\leq$





If $\overline{t}(r;s^{*})\leq\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z+1)$ and $\sigma_{s}\cdot(2w’)<\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})$ , then $\tau_{P}(r;s)\leq\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})$ because
$\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})-\overline{t}(r;s)=\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})-\overline{t}(r;s^{*})=4ng_{s}\cdot(\tau_{P}(r;s^{*}))=4ng_{s}(\tau_{P}(r;s^{*}))$ .
Further $\tau_{P}(r;s)\leq\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})-2$ if $\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z+1)-1<\overline{t}(r;s^{*})\leq\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})\leq\sigma_{s}\cdot(2w’)$ because
$\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})-2-\overline{t}(r;s)=\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})-\overline{t}(r;s^{*})=4ng_{s}\cdot(\tau_{P}(r;s^{*}))=4ng_{s}(\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})-2)$.
If $\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z+1)-1<\overline{t}(r;s^{*})<\sigma_{s}\cdot(2w’)<\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})$ , then $\tau_{P}(r:s)\leq\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})-1$ because
$\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})-1-\overline{t}(r;s)=\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})+1-\overline{t}(r;s^{*})=4ng_{s}\cdot(\tau_{P}(r;s^{*}))+1$
$=4ng_{s}\cdot(\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})-1)=4ng_{s}(\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})-1)$
Note that any meeting time of the players between $\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z+1)$ and $\sigma_{s}\cdot(2w’)$ is strictly
better under $s$ than $s^{*}$ and there is such a meeting for some $r$ . All the other meeting times
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are at least ae $\Re \mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\iota \mathrm{m}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}s$ than under $s^{*}$ so $E(s)<E(s^{*})$ which is a contraAction and the
lemma $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ . $1$
Our next result tells us that there is an optimal strategy for the players which oecil-
lates around the player’s starting point. Note that this result is not true for probability
distributions in $\mathfrak{B}$neral ae Theorem shows.
Notation. We will use $S$ to denote the aet of all optimal strategies $s^{*}$ such that $\delta_{s}\cdot(2i)<0$
and $\delta_{s}\cdot(2i-1)>0$ for all $i\geq 0$ for which the $\delta_{s}$ . are defined.
Lemma 3. $S\neq\emptyset$ .
Proof. For a strategy $s$ define $q(s)$ by
$q(s)=|${ $i:\delta_{s}(2i)\geq 0$ or $\delta_{s}(2i-1)\leq 0$} $|$ .
Suppoee $s=\emptyset$ , then we can chocse an optimal strategy $s^{*}$ such that $q(s^{*})= \min\{q(s)$ :
$s$ is optimal}. Now $q(s^{*})\geq 1$ so we can take $w$ to be the maximum value of $j$ satisfying
$(-1)^{j-1}\delta_{s}\cdot(j)>0$. We will consider only the caae in which there is a $w$ is even, say $w=2z$ ,
because the other caae $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ similarly. Now $2z<M$ because $\delta_{s}\cdot(2z-1)\leq 1$ by Lemma 1 and
$h_{2z}\neq 8n$ ; hence $\delta_{s}\cdot(2z+1)$ is $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{U}$-defined and poeitive so $\delta_{s}\cdot(2z+1)>\max_{0\leq i<z}\delta_{s}\cdot(2i+1)$ by
Lemma 2 and $h_{2z+1}>h_{2z}$ .
Consider the strategy $s$ given by $k_{i}=h_{i}$ for $i\leq 2z-2,$ $k_{2z-1}=h_{2z-1}+h_{2z+1}-h_{2z}$ and
$k_{i}=h_{i+2}$ for $i\geq 2z$ . We have
$\sigma_{s}(i)=\sigma_{s}\cdot(i)$ and $\delta_{s}(i)=\delta_{s}\cdot(i)$ for $i\leq 2z-2$
and
$\sigma_{s}(i)=\sigma_{s}\cdot(i+2)-2h_{2z}$ and $\delta_{s}(i)=\delta_{s}\cdot(i+2)$ for $i\geq 2z-1$ .
It is easy to check that $g_{s}(t)=g_{s}\cdot(t+2h_{2z})$ for $t\geq\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z-1)+2h_{2z}$ . Because $\delta_{s}\cdot(2z)>0$ , none of
$\tau_{+N}(r;s^{*}),$ $\tau_{-N}(r;s^{*})$ and $\overline{t}(r;s^{*})$ are in $[\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z-1),\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z-1)+2h_{2z}]$ for any $r$ and so it follows
that, for all $r$ ,
$\tau_{+N}(r;s)\leq\tau_{+N}(r;s^{*})$ , $\tau_{-N}(r;s)\leq\tau_{-N}(r;s^{*})$
and





Hence, for any $r$ satisfying $\overline{t}(r;s^{*})\geq\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z-1)+2h_{2z}$ , we have $\tau_{P}(r;s)\leq\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})-2h_{2z}$ . It is
straightforvrard to check that, for any $r$ such that $\overline{t}(r;s^{*})\leq\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z-1)$ and $g_{s}\cdot(\overline{t}(r;s^{*}))=-2r/4n$ ,
we have $\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})<\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z-1)$ and so $\tau_{P}(r;s)=\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})$ .
Hence let $r^{*}$ be such that $\overline{t}(r^{*}; s^{*})\leq\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z-1)$ and $g_{s}\cdot(\overline{t}(r^{*}; s^{*}))=2r/4n$ . If $\tau_{P}(r^{*}; s^{*})\leq$
$\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z-1),$ $\tau_{P}(r^{*}; s)=\tau_{P}(r^{*}; s^{*})$ . We now consider two caaes.
$(\alpha)$ Suppoee $\tau_{P}(r^{*}; s^{*})\geq\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z+1)$ , then $\sigma_{s}(j)\leq\tau_{P}(r^{*}; s^{*})\leq\sigma_{s}(j+1)$ for some odd $j\geq 2z+1$
so $\sigma_{s}(j-2)\leq\tau_{P}(r^{*};s^{*})-2h_{2z}\leq\sigma_{s}(j-1)$ and we have




$\tau_{P}(r^{*} ; s^{*})+h_{2z}-\overline{t}(r^{*} ; s)=4ng_{s}\cdot(\tau(r^{*} ; s^{*})-2h_{2z})+h_{2z}$
$\geq 4ng_{s}\cdot(\tau(r^{*} ; s)-h_{2z})$
so $\tau_{P}(r^{*} ; s)\leq\tau_{P}(r^{*}; s^{*})+h_{2z}$ .




because, by the maximality of $z$ and Lemma 2,
$h_{2z+2}\geq 4n\delta_{s}\cdot(2z+1)>4n\delta_{s}\cdot(2z-1)>h_{2z}$ .
We therefore have







Since $\tau_{P}(r_{1})\neq\tau_{P}(r_{2})$ for $r_{1}\neq r_{2}$ , there are $\mathrm{a}1$ most $h_{2z}$ values of $r$ satisfying $\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})\in[\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z-$
$1)+1,\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z)]$ and so a total of at most $2h_{2z}$ agents for which (1) holds.
If there are no $r^{*}$ for which (1) holds, $E(s)<E(s^{*})$ . Hence we may assume that there are
$r^{*}$ for which (1) holds and then $2r^{*}\leq 4n\delta_{s}\cdot(2z-1)$ and $\overline{t}(r;s^{*})>\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z-1)$ for $2r>4n\delta_{s}\cdot(2z-1)$ .
But then there are at least $\lceil(4n-4n\delta_{s}\cdot(2z-1))/2\rceil\geq\lceil(h_{2z+1}-h_{2z})/2\rceil$ values of $r$ for which
$\overline{t}(r;s^{*})>\sigma_{s}\cdot(2z-1)$ and therefore at least $h_{2z+1}-h_{2z}$ agents for which $\tau_{P}(r;s)\leq\tau_{P}(r;s^{*})-2h_{2z}$ .
Hence $E(s)\leq E(s^{*})$ so that $s$ is $\mathrm{a}1\infty$ optimal. But $q(s)<q(s^{*})$ which $\dot{\mathrm{g}}$ves a contradiction
and the lemma $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ . $1$
Intuitively it is fairly obvious that, if an optimal strategy oecillates about the player’s
starting point, then the oecillations will aet bigger and bigger. Our next lemma proves that
this intuition is conect. We omit proofs of Lemmas 46. See [8] for thoee.
Lemma 4. If $s^{*}\in S$ , then $|\delta_{s}\cdot(i)|$ for $i=1,$ $\ldots,M$ is a strictly increasing aequence.
Lemma 5. Let $s^{*}\in S$ , then $|\delta_{s}\cdot(i)|\geq 1/2$ implies $|\delta_{s}\cdot(i+1)|=1$ .
Lemma 6. Let $s^{*}\in S$ , then $\delta_{s}\cdot(1)<1/2$ implies $\delta_{s}\cdot(2)\leq-1/2$ .
Theorem 7. The pure symmetric markstart rendezvous value for the uniform distribution
on $[0,1]$ is $(9n+1)/8n$ and an optimal strategy for the players is to move forward for 1/2, then
backwar&for 3/2 and then forwar&thereafter.
Proof. By Lemma 3 there is an optimal strategy in $\mathcal{O}$ . We divide the analysis into two cases.
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(i) First aesume $h_{1}\geq 2n$ , then $\delta_{s}\cdot(2)=-1$ by Lemma 5 and it is easy to aee that $M=2$ if
$h_{1}=4n$ and $M=3$ otherwise; in the latter caae $h_{2}=h_{1}+4n$ and $h_{3}=8n$ . We have
$(4n)(8n)E(s^{*})= \sum_{\mathrm{r}=1}^{2n}r+2\sum r=1^{\lfloor h_{1}/2\rfloor}(h_{1}+r)+2\sum_{\mathrm{r}=\lfloor h_{1}/2\rfloor+1}^{2n}(2h_{1}+4n+r)+\sum_{r=1}^{2n}(2h_{1}+r)$
$=4 \sum_{\mathrm{r}=1}^{2n}r+2h_{1}(6n-\lfloor h_{1}/2\rfloor)+8n(2n-\lfloor h_{1}/2\rfloor)$ .
Whether $h_{1}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ odd or even, the expression is a negative quadratic in $h_{1}$ and so has a
minimum at one of the extreme points of the range for $h_{1}$ . Since $h_{1}\in[2n,4n]$ , we have
$32n^{2}E(s^{*})=4n(2n+1)+16n^{2}+n\dot{u}n\{4n(5n)-8n^{2},8n(4n)-16n^{2}\}$
$=36n^{2}+4n$ ,
the minimum being achieved when $h_{1}=2n$ .
(ii) Now aesume $h_{1}<2n$ , then $\delta_{s}\cdot(2)\leq-1/2$ by Lemma 6 and then $-4n\delta_{s}\cdot(2)=h_{2}-h_{1}$
is even by Lemma $2(\mathrm{b})$ and $\delta_{s}\cdot(3)=1$ by Lemma 5. Hence $M=3$ if $\delta_{s}\cdot(2)=-1$ and $M=4$





The expression is a negative quadratic in $h_{2}$ and so has its minimum at one of the extreme
points of the range of $h_{2}$ . By Lemma 6 $h_{2}-h_{1}\geq 2n$ so, because $h_{1}<2n$ , the extremes are
$h_{1}+2n$ and $h_{1}+4n$ . Routine calculations $\mathrm{g}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}$ that the minimizing point is the former if $h_{1}$
satisfies $h_{1}+\lfloor h_{1}/2\rfloor<n$ and the latter otherwise.
For the ffist caae substituting $h_{2}=h_{1}+2n$ into $E(s^{*})\dot{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$
$(4n)(8n)E(s^{*})=36n^{2}+4n+10nh_{1}-h_{1}^{2}-2(h_{1}+2n)\lfloor h_{1}/2\rfloor\geq 36n^{2}+4n+2h_{1}(4n-h_{1})$
$>n36n^{2}+4n$
in the range under consideration.




in the range lmder consideration and the result $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ . I
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